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Editorial
The intricacies of independence
Christopher Kuner*, Fred H. Cate**, Christopher Millard**,
and Dan Jerker B. Svantesson***
In the European Union, compliance with data protec-
tion requirements is overseen by public authorities
(ie data protection authorities or DPAs), who ‘shall act
with complete independence in exercising the functions
entrusted to them’.1 Given the growing number of
countries around the world that have adopted data
protection legislation based on the EU model, the
requirement of having an independent data protection
authority has spread to other regions as well. This
requirement has recently been reinforced by the judg-
ment of the European Court of Justice (ECJ) in the
case Commission v Germany,2 where the Court found
that the DPAs of the German federal states (La¨nder)
were structured so as to be subject to governmental
oversight, and that Germany had thus failed to properly
implement Article 28(1) of the EU Data Protection
Directive.
These developments lead to reflection on the concept
of ‘independence’. As the ECJ found, the basis for re-
quiring independence is that it helps ensure the effect-
iveness and reliability of supervision by allowing the
authorities to carry out their tasks free from external in-
fluence.3 The experience in Europe shows the need for
such regulatory independence, given that governments
sometimes have sought to influence the work of the
data protection authorities (one such example is the res-
ignation en masse of the entire Greek Data Protection
Commission in 2007 for alleged political interference).
However, the issue of independence is more complex
than it may seem at first glance. While independence is
indeed an indispensable requirement for the work of
DPAs, complete and total independence is never pos-
sible, or even desirable, on the part of any public
authority. Principles of accountability and transparency
require that a supervisory authority be answerable for
its actions (eg through the possibility of judicial
review), and that it be subject to controls in order to
ensure its integrity.
There are also different types of independence. The
ECJ decision concentrates on legal independence, that
is how the DPAs are set up and structured so as to be
free of undue governmental influence. However, just as
important is independence in terms of financial and
personnel resources. Indeed, many European data pro-
tection commissioners complain that they have insuffi-
cient resources to do their jobs properly (a view
supported by a recent study of the European Agency
for Fundamental Rights).4 Indeed, one European DPA
even had to shut down its operations for several
months toward the end of 2010 because it had com-
pletely run out of funds. Some European governments
have used structural independence as a ‘poisoned
chalice’, freeing their DPAs from being part of govern-
ment ministries but also making it clear that from that
point the DPA is required to provide for its own
budget. It is therefore welcome that the European
Commission has taken a broad view of the concept of
independence of the DPAs in its current review of the
EU data protection framework.5
Independence may also be viewed differently in dif-
ferent legal cultures. For instance, one non-EU DPA
has stated privately that in its country, being part of a
government ministry gives it more ‘clout’ and results in
it being taken more seriously than if it were set up as a
free-standing, independent regulatory authority. It may
therefore be necessary to consider the complete legal
and political structure of a country before determining
whether its data protection regulator is independent.
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1 EU Directive 95/46/EC, Article 28(1).
2 Case C-518/07 [2010] ECR I-0000.
3 Ibid. para. 25.
4 See European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights, ‘Data Protection in
the European Union: the Role of National Data Protection Authorities’
(2010), ,http://fra.europa.eu/fraWebsite/attachments/Data-protection_en.
pdf., at 42, accessed 19 October 2011, finding that eleven out of twenty-
seven national data protection authorities in the EU Member States were
unable to carry out the entirety of their tasks because of a lack of financial
and human resources.
5 See European Commission, Communication from the Commission to the
European Parliament, the Council, the Economic and Social Committee
and the Committee of the Regions, ‘A comprehensive approach on
personal data protection in the European Union’, COM(2010) 609 final,
4 November 2010, at 17.
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Differing views as to whether regulators in other coun-
tries are sufficiently independent have also given rise to
political tensions (such as with regard to the independ-
ence of public authorities in the United States). Given
the problems the EU has had in ensuring independence
among its own DPAs, governments in other regions
may smile when they are criticized for the supposed
lack of independence of their authorities.
The issue of whether entities performing compliance
and enforcement functions are ‘independent’ will have
substantial impact on the future data protection land-
scape around the world. An obvious example of this
occurs in the context of review of the EU legal frame-
work, in which the European Commission is certain to
pressure the EU Member States to improve implemen-
tation of the requirement of DPA independence result-
ing from the Directive and the ECJ judgment. But
considered more broadly, there is a clear link between
DPA independence and the impartiality and integrity
of compliance and enforcement schemes that go
beyond traditional governmental regulatory structures.
In an age of shrinking government budgets, and given
the growing interest in putting greater compliance
responsibilities on both data controllers and data pro-
cessors by requiring them to be accountable for their
processing of personal data, there will likely be
increased ‘outsourcing’ of compliance and enforcement
functions to third parties (including, for example, the
management of privacy seal programmes; running
alternative dispute resolution mechanisms; and operat-
ing certification and audit programmes, to name just a
few), with appropriate DPA supervision. However,
allowing third parties to manage such schemes will
only be effective and credible if they too are seen to
enjoy a high level of impartiality and independence
from both governments and private sector interests.
Like many other concepts in the world of data pro-
tection and privacy law, regulatory independence is a
more nuanced and complex subject than it may appear.
True independence is a multi-faceted concept that goes
beyond requiring the DPA to have a particular legal
structure. Rather, an evaluation of a number of ele-
ments is required, such as being insulated from polit-
ical influence; having a sufficient budget to do its job
properly; and being able to hire sufficient numbers of
qualified staff, while at the same time being able to
ensure sufficient accountability. Fulfilling all these
factors simultaneously is a tall order, but will become
increasingly necessary to ensure the legitimacy and
credibility of data protection supervision and enforce-
ment in the years ahead.
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